bankers a higher rate for assuming risk, then bankers will exploit the risk-return trade-off to invest in a riskier portfolio.
Why, then, do we have taxpayer-backed, flatrate deposit insurance?' A simple answer would be that the legislators who adopted federal de. posit insurance in 1933 did not understand the economic incentives involved. This simple answer seems wrong, however, it has been pointed out that certain observers articulated the problems with deposit insurance quite clearly in 1933. In this view, the fault lies with the policymakers of 1933, who failed to heed those warnings.
This fails to answer why policymakers would ignore these arguments. Moreover, it does not explain why it should have taken almost 50 years for the flaws in deposit insurance to take effect. This paper examines the deposit insurance debate of 1933, first to see precisely what the issues and arguments were at the time and, secondarily, to see how those issues were treated in the legislation. Briefly, I conclude that the legislators of 1933 both understood the difficulties with deposit insurance and incorpot-ated in the legislation numerous provisions designed to mitigate those problems.
The Banking Act of 1933 separated commercial and investment banking, limited bank securities activities, expanded the branching privileges of Federal Reserve member banks, authorized federal regulators to remove the officers and directors of member banks, regulated the payment of interest on deposits, arid increased minimum capital requirements for new national banks, among numerous lesser provisions. It also established a temporary deposit insurance plan lasting from January 1 to July 1, 1934, and a permanent plan that was to have started on July 1, 1934.' Although this paper focuses on deposit insurance, it is important to bear in mind that both the deposit insurance provisions of the bill and the debate that surrounded them each had a larger context. The various provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 constituted an interdependent package.
The deposit guaranty provisions of the bill were initially opposed by President Roosevelt, Carter Glass (Senate sponsor of the bill and Congress's elder statesman on banking issues), Treasury Secretary Woodin, the American Bankers Association (ABA), and the Association of Reserve City Bankers, among others.~Despite this opposition, on June 13, 1933, the bill passed virtually unanimously in the Senate, with six dissents in the Rouse, and was signed into law by the President on June 16.' Not surprisingly then, the public debate preceding and surrounding the adoption of federal deposit insurance was active and far-reaching. This paper is organized around the major themes of the debate: the actuarial questions concerning the effects of deposit insurance, the philosophical and practical questions of fairness to depositors and of depositor protection as an expedient means to financial stability, and the political and legal questions surrounding bank chartering and supervision. Much of the debate was motivated by economic and political selfinterest and was structured rhetorically in terms of morality and justice. Considerable attention is paid here to rhetorical detail." As much as possible, I have attempted to report the debate in its own terms-liberal use is made of quotations and epigraphs-rather than risk misconstruing the meaning through inaccurate paraphrase. ¶1 15 1 15 (21 2T fl TO r~tp .oj:.i 2 flzt.~..r.
The banking debate in 1933 covered not only deposit insurance and the separation of commercial and investment banking, but the full catalogue of financial matters: the gold standard, inflation, monetary policy and the contraction of bank credit, interstate branching, the relative merits of federal and state charters, holding company regulation, etc. By 1933, nearly anything to do with banks or banking was an important political issue. No nation, no industry, can survive such an espansion and contraction of money and credit. Give to me the power to double the money at will, and then give me the power to cut it square in two at will, and I can keep you in bondage.Ĩ t is reasonable to begin a recollection of the debate over deposit insurance with the price collapse on the New York Stock Exchange of October 29, 1929. The stock market crash was popularly recognized as the start of the Great Depression. The remainder of the Hoover administration's tenure witnessed historic declines in national economic activity. By the beginning of 1933, industrial production and nominal GNP had both been cut in half; unemployment had topped 24 percent. Bank failure rates, which had already been high throughout the 1920s, had increased fourfold, while both money supply and velocity had plummeted. The price level fell accordingly.
T'h.r.~Grs~~.a.t (]o.n.t;rar.I~1ic'n
For contemporary economic commentators, the stock market crash was more than a marker between historical eras. For many, there was a causal relationship between the stock market's collapse and subsequent real economic activity. in most cases, this causality was more elaborate than post hoc ergo propter hoc. A prescient Paul Warburg, for example, warned in March 1929:
If orgies of unrestrained speculation are permitted to spread too far, however, the ultimate collapse is certain not only to affect the speculators themselves, but also to bring about a general depression involving the entire country.'
The logic was that stock market speculation "absorbs so much of the nation's credit supply that it threatens to cripple the country's regular business. " 9 A more radical theory was advanced by the "liquidationists," who held sway in influential circles of government and the academy.'°F or them, the cyclical contraction was a good thing: it reflected the liquidation of unsuccessful investments that crept in during the boom years, thus freeing economic resources for a more efficient redeployment elsewhere.
Most of what remains of the debate is formalized oratory: prepared speeches, Congressional debate, letters to the editor, etc. Because the debate was a cacophony of voices, rather than an orderly dialogue, no attempt has been made to present the arguments in chronological order. A time line of the significant events of 1933 is provided in the shaded insert on page 55.
In terms of the written record, academic economists entered the debate late, for the most part after the Banking Act of 1933 had already been signed into law. See H.
Preston (1933) , Westerfield (1933) , Willis (1934) , Willis and Chapman (1934) , Taggart and Jennings (1934) , Fox (1936) and Jones (1938) . Phillips (1992) Rep. Weidenian, offering the metaphor that "the most dangerous beasts in the jungle make the softest approach," claimed that "international money lenders" had duped the Congress into creating a system for skimming hank gold reserves into a central pool "to feed the maw of international speculation. "" Alarm generated by the crisis and frustration at the lack of a remedy combined to expand the political horizons. Radical solutions were suggested. Informed by the political experiments under way elsewhere, relatively sober proposals were submitted to scrap the inefficient bureaucracies of representative democracy in favor of a fascist dictatorship or state socialism." More "Love (1932) , p. 25. "Before deposit insurance, banks in financial trouble were generally treated like any other business. Closure might be declared by supervisors or the directors of the bank. One option was then to seek protection from depositors and other creditors by declaring bankruptcy and accepting a court-appointed receivership. In the case of a temporary liquidity problem, a bank might instead suspend withdrawals or close to the public until the problem could be resolved. In practice, the terms "failure" and "suspension" were often used interchangeably. In the period 1921-32, roughly 85 percent of failed banks-holding 76 percent of the deposits in failed banks-were state banks (including mutual savings banks and private banks). See Bremer (1935) , especially footnote 1 and pp. 41-49. See Federal Reserve Board (1934a), Colt and Keith (1933) or Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for a chronology of the banking crisis and the bank holidays. In a sense, Roosevelt had stage-managed the crisis. By refusing to participate with the outgoing administration over the banking situation, he prolected the image of making a clean break with the past. At the same time, however, the resulting uncertainty surrounding his policy toward banking and the gold standard helped to provoke the crisis. See Kennedy (1973 ), pp. 135-55, or Burns (1974 "Roosevelt (1938) , p. 12.
"B. C. days-which is to say, Before the Crash. the day of adversity, thy strength is small. ' "22 For many, the Depression represented an atonement for the excesses of the bull market. By all accounts, 1929 was characterized by stock market speculation.23 As the extent of the avarice became clear with hindsight, the notion of economic depression as punishment for economic transgression took hold:
We are passing through chastening experiences, as severe for the banker as for anyone else, many of the illusions have disappeared and the trappings of a meretricious prosperity have been stripped from most persons."
The notion of recession as a necessary purgative unfortunately extended to policymakers as well. Mellon's advice to Hoover exposes the pious foundations to the liquidationist view of the Depression:
It will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will he adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less conipetent people." 'This fluency with righteousness revealed itself on all sides of the deposit insurance debate. Both proponents and detractors of the deposit guaranty provisions of the Banking Act argued that their position was ultimately a matter of simple justice, which dare not be denied. The bankers declared that well-managed banks should not be forced to subsidize poorly run banks. Supporters of the legislation maintained that depositors should not have to bear the losses accruing to their bankers' mistakes. Those who felt that deposit insurance was a ploy to destroy the dual banking system painted a picture of the unit bank as the pillar of the national economy, untainted by corruption. 'The remainder of the paper is organized around these three loosely defined constituencies.
[.i1'FITXUL/i.'..IES Opposition to deposit insurance can be roughly organized into two classes: objections on technical actuarial grounds, and objections to its anticipated impact on bank structure. The core constituency in the former category consisted of the moneycenter banks, with ABA President Francis Sisson, himself a Wall Street banker, taking the lead.'" The economic motivation for their opposition was the belief that insurance meant a net transfer from big banks, where the bulk of deposits lay, to state-chartered unit banks, where they expected the bulk of the losses.
nsur 'a.rp.cc' arid G;wn'anti'es Mellon's advice also offers an example of a common tendency to anthropomorphize the economy, in this case as a system to be purged. For a more extreme example, see Taussig (1932) , who draws an elaborate analogy between physicians and economists. '"The ABA (1933a) one stood on the issue, and the semantic controversy became a microcosm of the actuarial issues involved." By labeling the various schemes as plans to "guaranty" deposits, opponents were able to associate the plans immediately with the infelicitous recent experience with state deposit guaranty schemes (discussed in the next subsection). The natural response for supporters was to insist on a different label.
Both proponents and opponents devoted energy to identifying the desirable "insurance principle," which then either accurately described or failed to describe the proposed legislation.'" Like blind men describing an elephant, however, few agreed on a definition for the insurance principle. This was so, despite Rep. Steagall's claim that the principle of insurance was "the most universally accepted principle known to the business life of the world."
Deposit insurance was clearly similar in many respects to other types of insurance, which had been in vvidespread use in the United States for decades. Even the most ardent detractor recognized some resemblance:
The general argument employed to promrne the guaranty plan began with the premises that property can be insured and bank deposits are property. It travelled to the broad assumptions that the principle of the distribution of risk through insurance could he applied to bank deposits."
The salient principles here, espoused repeatedly by supporters of the legislation, were the diversification of risk and the diffusion of losses. in this respect, a national plan would differ from the state plans, which had "violated the primary insurance tenet that risks must be decentralized and sufficiently spread so as to avoid concentrated losses."
For others, the distinction between government and private backing defined the difference betiveen insurance and guaranty. Both Sen. Glass and Rep. Steagall were adamant that coverage be provided privately, not by the government: This is not a Government guaranty of deposits. The Government is only involved in an initial subscription to the capital of a corporation that we think will pay a dividend to the Government on its investmenL It is not a Government guaranty."
I do not mean to he understood as favoring Government guaranty of bank deposits. 1 do not. I have never favored such a plan. -Bankers should insure their own deposits."
'I'he argument against government backing was outlined by Sen. Bulkley. '" An insurance feature included in both the Steagall and Glass bills and in Sen. Vandenberg's temporary insurance amendment to the Glass bill was a provision for depositor co-insurance." The Glass and Steagall bills called for a progressive depositor copayment schedule: the first $10,000 would be covered in full, the next $40,000 would be covered at 75 percent, and only 50 percent of amounts over $50,000 would be covered; the Vandenberg amendment set a single coverage ceiling at $2,500. Some propo- '"The FDIC (1951) , p. 69, provides a clear distinction between insurance and guaranty. By their definition, a guaranty is a promise from the U. S. government to pay off depositors in a failed bank; insurance is paid from an independent private fund. There was no agreed definition for insurance or guaranty in 1933, however, although the explicit acknowledgement that "no clear distinction [between the terms 'guaranty' and 'insurance] has been made," was rare; see Rep. Bacon (R-NY). Congress/ona/ Record (1933) Congress " should reaffirm that deposits up to the statutorily prescribed amount in federally insured depository institutions are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States;" (emphasis added).
"Co-insurance is the insurance practice of involving the insured party in some portion of the risk. Common techniques of co-insurance are coverage ceilings, deductibles and copayment percentages. The aim of such provisions is to mitigate the problem of moral hazard or the tendency of people to behave more riskily when insured.
nents saw no need for such mitigating features.
Rep. Dingell (D-MI), for example, offered bankers no quarter; his idea was "to guarantee every dollar put in by the depositor from now on and to make the banker and the borrower pay the cost." For Sen. Vandenberg, on the other hand, co-insurance was crucial; he complained angrily when Treasury Secretary Woodin proposed "not a limited insurance such as is included in the amendment which the Senate adopted, but a complete 100% guarantee."
Opponents in the banking industry were unimpressed by such arguments. Although all of the proposals achieved a spreading of losses and many had other familiar features of insurance, such as co-insurance or provision for a large reserve fund, they still were not "insurance." Francis Sisson was obstinate: "Detailed and technical differences in this bill as compared with former guaranty schemes do not differentiate it in essential principle from them "41 For all their trouble, crafters of the legislation had failed to meet the bankers' standard for insurance, the principle of selected risks:
Insurance involves an old and tried principle. The essence of insurance is the payment by the insured of premiums in actt,arial relation to the risk involved. Under the terms of the permanent plan, however, the costs or premiums are not charged according to the risk.~' Roosevelt made a similar connection. In his first presidential press conference, he asserted:
I can tell you as to guaranteeing bank deposits my own views, and I think those of the old Administration. The general underlying thought behind the use of the word 'guarantee' with respect to bank deposits is that you guarantee bad banks as well as good banks. The minute the Government starts to do that the Government runs into a probable loss.~' Although he associates the "guaranty" terminology with government backing, its defining characteristic is clearly the absence of selected risks.
Despite the attention given to selected risks in the debate, no significant attempt appears to have been made to include a risk-based premium in legislation. Emerson, for one, thought such an arrangement could work.'" The ABA, on the other hand, thought it impossible:
The apparently unsurmountable actuarial difficulty in the guaranty plan appears to be the impossibility of placing it on the basis of selected risks; the risks involved were "wholly unpredictable," and banks were subject to "internal deterioration" when their deposits were guaranteed." ills! rrrr' a.nd Gr.rrzauisv The "guaranty" terminology connoted the defunct state deposit guaranty plans, a specter that terrorized the bankers. The mere mention of deposit guaranties could induce a banker to show "every sign of incipient apoplexy.""' At the same time, the unvarying failure of the state plans provided a trove of evidence for foes of the federal scheme." Release of the ABA report coincided with the introduction of the Glass and Steagall bills in Congress. It found perverse delight in the failure of all eight of the state plans:
Eight large scale tests, by practical working experience, of the guaranty of bank deposits plan as a means for strengthening banking conditions and safeguarding the public interest are a matter of record. Each one of these attempts failed of its purpose.
Taken separately, special circumstances such as technical defects in the plan or faulty administration might be held accountable for the breakdown in any given instance, leaving it an open question as to whether the idea might not be successful under different circumstances. Taken as a composite whole, however, the failures of the various plans not only confirm one another in their defects, but each one also supplies added special features that were tested and found wanting. '" This unbroken string of failures demanded an explanation from supporters of federal legislation. Proponents chose to distinguish clearly the ne%v plan from the state schemes: "there is no logical relationship between these old State Guarantees and this new Federal Insurance; no analogy; no parallel; and no reason to confuse the mortality of the former with the vitality of the latter."
To make this case, supporters emphasized foremost the much broader geographic-and therefore industrial-diversification of a federal insurance fund. "The fact that bank-depositguaranty projects have failed in local, restricted areas only proves one of the fundamental principles of insurance, that is, that there must exist wide and general distribution and diversification" In particular, the old plans were said to have suffered from a "one-crop" problem, that is, their application in states overwhelmingly dependent upon agriculture:
There is a vast difference between what can be accomplished by a small number of banks in one State dependent upon a single crop and what can be successfully accomplished by the banking system of this great Nation that holds the financial leadership of the world in its hands."
On this point, at least, the bankers were forced to concede."
The bankers revealed the geographic breadth of the federal plan to be a two-edged sword, '"ABA (1933a) Association" (1933), and O'Connor (1933) . In a tribute at the next convention,
Sisson's ABA colleagues offered that his death was "a tragic demonstration of devotion to duty even to the extent of exceeding the physical power of endurance ... He was a martyr to his work in your behalf? ' Nahm (1934) , p. 30.
'"5everal groups dissected the state plans in the course of the debate; see American Savings, Building and Loan Institute (1933) , ABA (1933a), Blocker (1929) , Boeckel (1932) , and the Association of Reserve City Bankers (1933). Reference was also made to an earlier essay by Robb (1921) .
There are also numerous retrospective accounts of the state guaranty plans, including Calomiris (1989 and 1990), Wheelock (1992b and 1992c) , and Wheelock and Kumbhaker (1991) ; the most comprehensive, however, is Warburton (1959), parts ot which appear in FDIC (1953 and 1957) . The original legislation is collected in Federal Reserve Board (1925a and 1925b and that a predominant element in the internal conditions of the hank that remained sound in the fare of the same external conditions was good management.~"
What was needed was to teach "the conception of scientific banking." 6 '
The second step in the logic of opposition was an objection to the subsidy implicit in a guaranty. In the tones of a prudish parent, the ABA complained that the beneficiaries of state systems had been the "bankers with easier standards," who gained competitive advantages over those with "sounder but less attractive methods.""~The subsidy was especially problematic among those banks "which have little chance of ultimate success. ""' A bank which does not earn a fair average rate of return over a period of years not only is unable to build up reserves against had times, hut, in order to improve profits, is under constant temptation to take risks 'vhich in the end are likely to lead to failure.
The tendency of a guaranty plan will he to nurtut-e these unprofitable units and keep them going temporarily in the knowledge that upon failure the losses can be shifted to other banks.e4
Thus, the subsidy was seen to extend beyond the simple protection of unsound institutions from the competitive pressures of vigilant depositors. Given their contention that, "no provision is made for building up a reserve fund," losses charged to the insurer by failing banks would have to he recouped after the fact from the survivors.°Such a system would necessarily entail transfers of wealth from surviving to failed banks.
There was no consensus in Congress on the importance of discipline; some members pointed out that life insurance was no incentive for suicide.56 The framers of the Glass and Steagall bills, however, recognized the validity of the hankers' objections and addressed the issue directly. Both hills, as well as the temporary in-"ABA (1933a). p. 13. "The advertisement above depicts an insurer's characterization of the bad banker. Coincidentally, President Roosevelt had been a vice-president for the Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland after his unsuccessful VicePresidential bid in the 1920 election.
""Federal Guaranty of Bank Deposits" (1932) ance, on the other hand, leaves the individual bank and banker so seriously responsible for such a preponderance of their resources that there is no appreciable immunity at all."S en. Glass noted a second source of discipline inherent in the plan. Because the banks insured each other, deposit insurance would "lead to the severest espionage upon the rotten banks of this country that we have ever had. "" 5 Under both the temporary and permanent plans, the small depositor was to be covered in full, in recognition of his inability to monitor bank management adequately:
At present the depositor is at the mercy of his fellow depositors, over whom he has no control, and of the management of the bank, about which he is not usually in a position to be well informed. The depositor takes the risks, and the banks take the profits."
A survey conducted by the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve in May 1933
revealed that the ceiling of $2,500 under the temporary plan would fully cover 96.5 percent of depositors and 23.7 percent of total deposits in member banks.'°r 'ij's~c;i;tj~.:i..~i:~sI1'tW hile most industry opponents fought the deposit insurance plan on actuarial grounds, supporters argued that deposits per se required protection, to stabilize the medium of exchange and promote a renewed expansion of bank credit. More significantly, proponents responded with an argument of powerful simplicity: the losses to innocent depositors in a bank failure were a plain injustice. Given the status of banks in the political climate of 1933, this was a charge that the bankers ultimately could not counter.
The use of banking funds for speculation became a stench in the nostrils of the people."
There was a strong sense that the banking industry in the 1920s had functioned as an elaborate network to collect savings at the local level and funnel them into lending on securities speculation:
Another cause for many banking collapses was the domination of smaller banks by their large metropolitan correspondents, which drained funds from the country districts for speculative purposes and loaded up the small bank with worthless securities." 2 Indeed, this was a primary motivation for those sections of the Banking Act requiring a separation of commercial and investment banking. Similar arguments were brought against proposals for nationwide branch, chain and group banking."
A sensitivity to such a possibility was doubtless nurtured by the popularity of Ponzi schemes in the 1920s, including the infamous Florida land swindIes."~With such analogies in mind, banks came to be seen as merely fueling departments in enterprises run not by bankers concerned with operating banks but by promoters whose object was to exploit the credit resources of the bank. The primary evil in our banks for many years has been the incessant efforts of promoters to get control of the funds which flow into the banks. The bank is the depository of the community's funds and as such is the basis of the available credit of the community. The promoterbanker needs nothing so much as access to these credit pools." Such accusations were inevitably tinged with at least a hint of the conspiratorial. "" In keeping with this theme, the issues were framed for popular consumption as a morality play in which the naive depositor is pitted against the sophisticated banker. The depositor tucks away the hard-earned wages of his honest labor, only to be systematically duped by the cunning intrigues of the banker. At the extreme, some politicians played the religious card face up: "We discovered that what we believed to be a bank system was in fact a respectable racket and so many connected with it only cheap, petty loan sharks and Shylocks." In the end, a providential government was seen to intercede on behalf of the depositor, and deposit insurance was trumpeted as "the shadow of a great rock in a weary land" 8
The notion of the small depositor as an innocent victim had immense popular appeal. McCutcheon's 1931 political cartoon celebrating the blamelessness of the depositor in a failed bank won the Pulitzer Prize (above right). Such popularity, of course, was plainly evident to politicians, who responded by introducing deposit insurance legislation in Congress. Rep. Steagall is reported to have told House Speaker Garner in April 1932, "You know, this fellow Hoover is going to wake up one day soon and come in here with a message recommending guarantee of bank deposits, and as sure as he does, he'll be re-elected. Although, as a strictly political matter, depositor protection was the central motivation responsible for the progress of deposit insurance in Congress, other forces were at issue. Chief among these was the role of banking in the real economy. Regarding bank failures, it was recognized that causality ran two ways: just as the general drop in real incomes had caused loan defaults and thus widespread bank failures, bank failures and the concomitant restriction of bank services had caused real incomes to fall. The latter effect was seen to operate both directly and indirectly.
Bank suspensions and failures could trap depositors' wealth for a period of months or even years until the bank either reopened or its bankruptcy was resolved. The direct result was reduced consumption and investment spending by the affected depositors. In the extreme case, when a town's lone bank failed, even the simplest forms of exchange could be hopelessly encumbered:
[The unacceptability of failurel would perhaps not be so if they were grocery stores or butcher shops, where failure would be disastrous to only a few people at most; but bank failures paralyze the economic life of whole communities, not only through the loss of money accumulations but by the destruction of the deposit currency which is the principal medium of exchange in all business activity." '" Under such circumstances, some affected regions instituted scrip currencies, wooden coinage or systematic barter arrangements, the most elaborate of which was the Emergency Exchange Association in New York, headed by Leland Olds.'"" A depositor's natural response to these possibilities was to withdraw his funds before failure occurred. Both bank runs and the hoarding of currency received considerable attention."°W ithdrawals for the purpose of safeguarding one's wealth were deemed unpatriotic; legislation was even proposed to outlaw the practice. Banks had a natural response to the threat of runs: "Credit was tightened in the desire to remain as liquid as possible to meet the emergencies of runs."" Bankers maintained large cash reserves rather than lend:
it is estimated that banks now have available billions of dollars of collateral for use in extending loans, but the plain fact is that for more than 3 years bankers have given little thought to anything except to keep their banks in liquid condition
The fear that grips the minds and hearts of bankers, keeping ever before them the nightmare of bank runs, makes it impossible for them to extend the credits that are indispensable to trade and commerce.' 2 This analysis is confirmed by the facts. The aggregate excess reserves of Federal Reserve member banks, for example, had ballooned from $42 million in October 1929 to a peak of $584 million in January 1933, even though the number of member banks had fallen from 8,616 to 6,816 over roughly the same period."' Thus, bank failures were seen to have an indirect effect on output, as both depositors and bankers in solvent institutions prepared for the possibility of runs and failures.
In the final analysis, depositor protection and stabilization of the medium of exchange were recognized as opposite sides of the same coin:
We may talk about percentage of gold back of our currency, we may discuss technical provisions of legislation ... The public does not understand these technical discussions, but from one end of this land to the other the people understand what we mean by guaranty of bank deposits; and they demand of you and me that we provide a banking system worthy of this great Nation and banks in which citizens may place the fruits of their toil and know that a " 'Fisher (1932) , p. 143. ""Greer (1933b) , p. 538.
""See "What'll We Use for Money ?" (1933) . ""See lves (1931) " 'Federal Reserve Board (1943), pp. 72-74, 371. deposit slip in return for their hard earnings will be as safe as a Government bond. [Ap- plause.]
They know that banks cannot serve the public until confidence is restored, until the public is willing to take money now in hiding and return it to the banks as a basis for the expansion of bank credit. This is indispensable to the support of business and the successful financing of the Treasury. It will bring increased earnings, higher incomes, and make it possible to balance the Government's Budget without resort to vicious and vexatious methods of taxation. '" As such, they should be considered inseparable; it is clear that supporters of the legislation intended it to achieve both ends. Attempts to rank the two issues according to their-relative importance are likely to be inconclusive."'
One banker in my state attempted to marry a white woman and they lynched him.""
The opposition to federal deposit guaranties emanated largely from the nation's bankers. This fact was a crushing liability to their cause in the political climate of 1933. The introduction of the Glass and Steagall bills came on the heels of the banking panic and, not entirely coincidentally, amid the daily revelations of selfdealing and other cupidities from the Pecora hearings."' The banker had become a pariah. ""Rep. Steagall, Congressional Record (1933 ), p. 3840. " 5 Golembe (1960 has argued that, among the motives for deposit insurance, depositor protection was secondary to protection of the circulating medium. Others have gone further, arguing that protection of depositors was a rationalization created after the fact. The issue raised by Golembe is certainly plausible; Rep. Bacon, for example, appears to have ranked them this way [Congressional Record (1933), p. 3959] . On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Sen. Glass in 1933 abandoned his earlier plan for a liquidation fund, which would have prevented the freezing of funds in suspended banks white still not protecting depositors from loss. The latter notion of depositor protection as an ex-post or revisionist justification is clearly false, however.
""This was a popular quip that made the rounds in 1933. In this instance, it is attributed to Carter Glass; see Kennedy (1973), p. 133; Bell (1934) , pp. 262-63, also cites it. The loke is startling in its insensitivity. Examples of bankers of the day indulging in overtly racist humor are also available; see, for example, Dyer (1933) , pp. 91 and 94, and Amberg (1935), p. 49.
'"'The hearings were organized in January 1933 by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, and were run by the Committee's counsel, Ferdinand Pecora; see Pecora (1939) . The dust jacket relates that, in one inRoosevelt fired the opening volley for his administration in his inaugural address:
Plenty is at our doorstep, hut a generous use of it languishes in the very sight of the supply. Primarily this is because the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed, through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure, and abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous money changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men. "" He went on to demand safeguards against the "evils of the old order": strict supervision of banking, an end to speculation with "other people's money," and provision for an adequate but sound currency. "" Others were happy to follow this lead. it was commonplace to hold the bankers, and particularly their "speculative orgy " of 1929, responsi- ble for the nation's woes:
You brought this country to the greatest panic in human history~. There never was such an economic failure in the history of mankind as your outfit has brought upon us at this time, and it is due to this same speculation that you are defending here more than any other one thing.
But these affiliates, I repeat, were the most unscrupulous contributors, next to the debauch of the New York Stock Exchange, to the financial catastrophe which visited this country and was stance, a journalist "begged Mr. Pecora not to break so many front-page stories daily because it was physically impossible to cover them all:' See Benston (1990) for a thorough, revisionist view of the hearings. ""Roosevelt (1938) , pp. 11-12. ""Roosevelt (1938) , p. 13. His reference to "other people's money" was a nod to Justice Brandeis's book of the same title, a reprint of his articles on the money trust that appeared in Harper's Weekly in 1913-14. Those who hold that all the great thoughts have long since been had will be pleased to learn that Kane's (1991) reference to the "Sorcerer's Apprentice" segment of Walt Disney's Fantasia as a metaphor for bank regulation was anticipated by Brandeis. Lacking Mickey Mouse's rendition, however, Brandeis was forced to use the German original, Goethe's Qer
Zauberlehrling; see Brandeis (1933) , p. vU.
'°"Sen.Brookhart (R-IA) speaking to a New York Stock Exchange official at a Senate committee hearing in 1932;
quoted by Danielian (1933) , p. 496.
mainly responsible for the depression under which we have been suffering since."
In the previous year, Huey Long had announced his intent to campaign for Roosevelt under the slogan: "Rid the country of the millionaires.u202 A popular ditty mocked:
Mellon pulled the whistle, Hoover rang the bell, Wall Street gave the signal, And the country went to hell."
In short, the bankers were vilified.
Although some felt such indiscriminate abuse was slanderous, they fought against the tide.b04 One of the casualties of the anti-banker sentiment was the bankers' battle against deposit insurance. Some in Congress announced that the bankers' opinions should be openly ignored:
I believe that the myopic banker as an adviser should receive about as much consideration at the hands of the House as a braying jackass on the prairies of Missouri. They proved by their inability to maintain their own business that they have absolutely no right to advise the House as to what course we should follow."
The bankers, while they acknowledged the merit of individual aspects of the deposit insurance proposals, obstinately refused to countenance any of the schemes as a realistic reform. Even as the legislation was signed into law, Francis Sisson called a crusade, rallying ABA members to fight "to the last ditch against the guaranty provisions" of the bill"" That the bankers' concerns were not ignored entirely resulted largely from the presence in government of opponents of deposit guaranties who were more politically astute than the bankers themselves. Sen. Glass, for example, compromised his principles in a bid for some control over the legislation, explaining that it was "better to deal with the problem in a cautious and a conservative way than to have ourselves run over in a stampede." Roosevelt held out until the very end, thus forcing Congress to concede in delaying implementation of the temporary plan until January 1934.~~. n The ramifications of deposit insurance were recognized as far-reaching. In many ways, the central and most contentious battle concerned neither actuarial feasibility nor the desirability of protecting deposits, but the regulatory issues of bank chartering and supervision. Because of the fundamental legal issues involved, it was here that the economic and political aspects of the debate became most fully intertwined. This was a fight with the weight of a long tradition behind it, and arguments were often selfconsciously historical -.~c 7 ,.
Bank examinations to be effective must be made by experienced men, free from political influence.
We will never have proper banking supervision, national or state, until it is taken entirely
away from political influence. '"" Much of the blame for high rates of bank failure throughout the l9ZOs was placed upon competition between state and federal authorities. Because banks could choose the less costly of federal and state charters-and the associated regulations-state and federal regulators were forced into a "competition in laxity" if they were to sustain the realm of their bureaucratic influence."" For example, as a prelude to recommending broader powers for national banks, Comptroller Pole emphasized that:
If Congress therefore would protect itself from the loss of its present banking instrumentality, it must make it to the advantage of capital to seek the national rather than a [state] trust company charter.
'°15en. Glass, Congressional Record (1933) , p. 3726. Glass is referring to the proposed separation of investment affiliates from Federal Reserve member banks. "Kent (1932) , p. 260.
" Kennedy (1973) , p. 26.
""See, for example, Bell (1934) . Sisson (1933b) , p. 30, offered that the treatment of bankers as "demons of darkness" and as an 'unseen mythical power for evil which spreads its baneful influence over [human beings]" merely satisfied an emotional need for a scapegoat.
""Sisson's telegram is quoted in Pecora (1939) , pp. 294-95.
"Sen. Glass, Congressional Record (1933), p. 5862. ""Andrew (1934b) , p. 93. ""Daiger (1933) , p. 563, attributes coinage of the phrase "competition in laxity" to Eugene Meyer in 1923 testimony to the House Banking and Currency Committee. The phrase attained some popularity; it was also used, for example, by Wyatt (1933), p. 186, and AwaIt (1933) , p. 4. ""Rep. Dingell, Congressional Record (1933) , p. 3906.
It is within the po\•ver of Congiess to tu,'r~the advantage in favor of the national banks and thereby make it to the interest of all banks to opeiate under tl,e national charter" In the eyes of opponents of deposit insurance, an especially important manifestation of the competition in laxity was the "promiscuous granting of bank charters." The immediate result of loose chartering was a condition called "over-banking," or a host of weak, unreliable banks that crowd one another-out of existence by being too nun~erouslyorganized in places where there is no support for the multifarious institutions that have been established there."
This "indiscreet indulgence of charter applicants" was held responsible for the vast numbers of bank failures throughout the previous decade:"
There are too many banks in the United States. The areas of greatest density of banks per capita coincide with the al-eas whet-c failures are proportionately highest. "" The function of a deposit guaranty under such circumstances would be to exacerbate the problem by mitigating one source of public scrutiny: inspection by depositors. Opponents confirmed their contention by reference to the ill-fated state guaranty schemes:
In practice the guaranty of deposits plan generally tended to induce an unsound expansion in the number of banks ---This was clearly connected with the indiscriminate popular confidence created toward the banks under the guaranty."
It is to be feared that the adoptior~of deposit guaranty laws may have somewhat retarded the inevitably slow and unsensational process of strengthening the banking system by strict regulation, vigilant public opinion and strict i-cquirements. "" The Association of Reserve City Bankers went further, predicting that managers of the insurance fund would be slow to close troubled institutions." In addition to regulatory competition, some saw political influence as a secondary force debilitating the supervisory process:
We never will have such super-vision under political regulation and examination: we will never have arw supervision worthy of tl~ename that does not have real authority and heavy responsibility tied to it."
Only a few supporters of insurance addressed directly the plan's implications for the regulatory process, which they presented as a counterweight to incentives for bad banking under a guaranty. Rome Stephenson felt that the additional regulatory powers in the Banking Act differentiated the FDIC markedly from the state plans:
Right there is the crux of the debate: Will banks under the federal plan be permitted the abuses which were tolerated in every one of the states where guaranty was tried? If so, then failure is inevitable, if not, success is practically certain.... Let me assert unequivocally that the men who drew up the federal plan profited by the mistakes of the state guaranty failures and avoided then~None of the state laws had teeth in tl,em. The federal law has teeti, like a man-eating shark, and already has done some highly effective biting. "" Carter (;lass', x' ailing that "the Comptroller's office has not done its duty-its sworn duty- "Pole (1929) ' '"Stephenson (1934) Questions about the effect of insurance on the quality of chartering and supervision were sideshows to the main event, however. At the heart of the debate lay a decades-old controversy over the dual banking system. Given its far-reaching nature, the proposed legislation was universally regarded as a prime opportunity for fundamental changes in banking policy.
Cotnptroller Pole had campaigned vigorously throughout his four-year tenure for some form of interstate branching for national banks. He drew a strong distinction between the small) state-chartered, rural unit bank-the "country" bank-and the large, nationally chartered institution. While he pretended to maintain great respect for the small unit bank as the "single type of institution which has contributed the most to --. the foundation of our national development," he was fighting to have them replaced by branch networks of national banks.'~' He justified this split sentiment by arguing that irreversible social changes-telephone, radio, and especially the automobile-had forever obviated the rural isolation that had made the unit bank competitively viable. Accompanied by a long parade of statistics, he emphasized the high failure rate of small, state-chartered banks during the 1920sJ" The country bank, he said, could not survive in competition with large metropolitan institutions, which had more professional management and were inevitably better diversified. " Pole (1929 ), p. 24. "See Pole (1930a , 1932a and 1932b That it was such a threat testifies to the influence and legislative skill of Carter Glass.
Comptroller
Sen. Glass, who had shepherded the Federal Reserve Act through the House in 1913, was protective of his handiwork:
I took occasion to tell the Secretary of the Treasury the other day that if they pursue present policies much longer they will literally wreck the Federal Reserve System; that Woodrow Wilson in history will enjoy the distinction of having set up a banking system that fought the war for us and saved the Nation in the post-war period, and if they keep on making a doormat of it this Congress will enjoy the distinction of having wrecked it."
His primary concern in the banking legislation of 1933 was to buttress that system. Thus, the Glass bill required all FDIC member banks to join the Federal Reserve System, ostensibly to give the Fed the legal right to examine FDIC members (the Fed was to be a prominent shareholder in the FDIC)." Because an uninsured country bank facing insured competitors was not considered viable, and because Fed membership would require at least $25,000 minimum capital, deposit insurance represented the end for the small, state non-member banks." Deposit insurance would force a consolidation of banking within the Federal Reserve System.
It is instructive to note that Glass had abandoned an earlier scheme that would have forced the same consolidation within the Fed: unification of banking in the National Banking System. Comptroller Pole had sought to accomplish the same thing indirectly, by providing national banks with an undeniable competitive advantage in the form of interstate branching privileges. In 1932, Glass had requested of Gov. Meyer of the Federal Reserve a constitutional method of unifying banking:
Meyer: "Do you want to bring about unified banking?" "Why, undoubtedly, yes." "I shall be glad to help you." "I think the curse of the banking business in this country is the dual system." Meyer: "Then the Board is entirely in sympathy with the Committee on the subject.""'
The result was a legal opinion prepared by the General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Board on the constitutionality of such unification in the absence of a constitutional amendment."" While Board Counsel confirmed that such a constitutional means existed, Sen. Gore introduced a constitutional amendment."' Constitutionality was crucial, because champions of the rural unit bank were certain to raise the powerful specter of states' rights in opposition:
The fight regarding the American Dual System of Banking is a clear-cut issue between those who believe in the sovereignty of our states and home rule, and those who are in favor of a 'unification of our banking system' into one Washington bureau."" Indeed, the political sensitivity of the states' rights issue was sufficient to force Sen. Glass to abandon such a direct assault on the state banks before it could earnestly begin." ""White (1982 ""White ( , 1983 ""White ( , 1984 reviews the historical connections between deposit insurance and bank chartering. If there is one purpose more than another which is inherent in the amendment which is now at stake in this conference, it is the purpose to protect the smaller banking institutions, and to make the reopening of closed banks possible as speedily and as safely as it can be done.'~°T he final legislation was a two-stage compromise between Sen. Glass's push for unification and the Steagall-Long coalition's desire to preserve the dual banking system. In the first stage, Glass agreed to support a deposit guaranty in exchange for provisions for significantly expanded Federal Reserve authority:
With these provisions, dependent upon them in fact, the Senate bill drafters were willing to accept the new Steagall bill for the insurance or guaranty of bank deposits in Federal Reserve member banks-but in member banks only. '"' In the second stage, the dual banking supporters obtained several concessions, most notably: '"' It is obvious from an examination of the record that the debate surrounding the adoption of federal deposit insurance was both wideranging and well informed. The banking crisis in March 1933, coming at the depths of the Great Depression and breaking on inauguration day, had focused attention with unique intensity on all aspects of public policy toward banks. While some contended that the urgency accompanying the crisis injected haste into the proceedings, it also ensured that all major interests were roused to offer their views and argue their cases. ""See Anderson (1933a) , p. 17. They were loined by Sen.
Vandenberg, whose temporary plan extended insurance to state non-member banks upon certification of soundness by the relevant state banking authority. ""There was little fondness connecting the two Southern Democrats. Smith and Beasley (1939), pp. 346-47, relate that, in the heat of the banking debate and in response to a series of Long's ad hominems, Glass unleashed a string of invective that literally chased the Kingfish -his hands clamped over his ears -off the Senate floor. This version of events is apocryphal, however. Opinions varied on the significance of the consolidation of bank regulation implicit in the final act. Bankers Magazine editorialized that, "while this development will bring the state banks under a considerable degree of Federal control, it will not -for a time at least -result in that unification of banking regarded by many as desirable. The state banks, by coming into the deposit-guaranty scheme have escaped with their lives." "State Banks Qualifying for Insurance of Deposits" (1933 ), p. 490. Anderson (1933c , p. 17, warned that, "with all this variation, this glorification of the unit bank principle, however, comes the hard fact that these institutions, for the first time in their history, will be under one direct control whose authority is such as practically to set aside all the principle privileges for which state banks have fought so long." '"'Amberg (1935), p. 49. it has been suggested that the framers of the 1935 significantly weakened the requirements Banking Act of 1933 failed to consider the warnings about the potential dangers of government-sponsored deposit insurance.'~Ĩt is significant, then, that an examination of the historical record clearly shows that bill's chief patrons were aware of the failure of the state schemes, the actuarial arguments against deposit guaranties, and the various chartering issues involved. Moreover, they took these issues into account when crafting the bill. In the end, even the Association of Reserve City Bankers was able to recommend the temporary insurance plan: tt appears to this Commission that if guaranty is retained after July 1, 1934 [the date for implementation of the permanent plani, this ternporary plan, in sonic modified form, would meet every emergency need, and eliminate many of the dangers in the permanent plan.'~Ũ nder the temporary plan, coverage ceilings were conservative, the insurance corporation was emphatically segregated from the federal taxpayer, chartering standards for national banks were raised, and supervisory authority was broadly increased. These characteristics were retained under the permanent plan of the Banking Act of 1935. As such, deposit insurance, as construed in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, succeeded in simultaneously protecting the small depositor and leaving the banker answerable to both supervisors and large depositors for the quality of his management.
At the same time, the deposit insurance provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 were used as leverage to consolidate the industry within the Federal Reserve, although the Banking Act of for Fed membership of insured banks. A piecemeal dismantling of other provisions of the original legislation has also occurred in the intervening decades: coverage ceilings have risen steadily, even after accounting for inflation and before considering brokered deposits or too-bigto-fail policies; the full taxing authority of the U. S. 'Freasury has, defacto, been inserted behind the deposit insurance corporations; and deregulation has subjected both banks and thrifts to increasingly harsher competition-and, in some cases, relaxed regulatory scrutiny-without simultaneously making bankers responsible to depositors for the riskiness of bank assets.' 4°I t is perhaps with this more recent negation of individual elements of a complex and interdependent package of bank reforms that we should seek the proximate cause of our recent deposit insurance troubles, rather than with policy flaws in the Banking Act of 1933 itself.
This list of references contains several sources that are relevant to the debate, but which are not cited directly in the text. These additional references are included to provide others interested in the topic with a more comprehensive listing of the primary source materials. In particular, Kaufman (1990) states, pp. 1-2: "Some of the problems are new, however many have been around for many years and were even clearly foreseen at the time they were forming or, worse yet, even earlier. at the time their underlying causes were put in place in the form of legislation or regulation. This is the case with the extant structure of federal deposit insurance. Among those forecasting the problems that this innovation would come to cause was Guy Emerson, a long-time economist for the Bankers Trust Company (New York). His warnings are evidentin his article "Guaranty of Deposits Under the Bank- it was in fact ultimately superseded by a modified form of the temporary plan. '" 6 The technical legal question of the de jure liability of the United States government for deposit insurance is surprisingly complex, and the answer is not entirely clear. As a practical matter, however, the question is neither complex nor unclear. See FDIC (1990) . pp. 4438-39.
